ABSTRACT. Recent work has explored the implications of consumer biases for firm behavior and has documented that profit-maximizing firms exploit consumer biases in the contracts they offer. In this paper we show how ownership of the firm by its customers, as well as nonprofit ownership, can be used as commitment devices to avoid offering contracts that exploit consumer biases. In a model of a market in which for-profit investor-owned firms and mutual firms compete, sophisticated consumers who are biased but aware of their biases patronize mutual firms, while unbiased consumers and naive consumers who underestimate their biases patronize investor-owned firms. Mutuals serving sophisticates offer high base prices but low "penalty" prices, while investor-owned firms offer low base prices and high penalty prices, resulting in transfers from naive biased consumers to unbiased consumers. Data from the markets for credit cards and other financial services provide evidence for our theory. Comparing credit card contract terms, we find mutuals do offer higher base prices, such as introductory interest rates, but lower penalty prices, such as default interest rates, than investor-owned firms do. We also present evidence that consumers sort into firms according to their perceptions of their biases.
INTRODUCTION
There is growing evidence that consumers make systematic errors in decision making and that firms fashion consumer contracts to exploit those mistakes. For example, banks charge penalties in the fine print of credit card agreements, such as default interest rates that apply when consumers miss a payment, and consumers who make mistakes are more likely to trigger these penalties. 1 These mistakes by consumers result in social costs, particularly when consumers are not fully aware of their difficulty making good decisions. Moreover, the social costs of these mistakes are magnified by the strategic reaction of firms-contracts designed to take advantage of consumer mistakes can further distort consumer decision making.
2 While regulating the terms of contracts could in principle abate these social costs, to get the regulations right puts an immense informational burden on the government, resulting in the risk that regulations would do more harm than good. 3 And less intrusive remedies, such as mandatory disclosure and market competition, may fail to cure these inefficiencies.
In this paper we show how ownership of the firm by its customers, as well as nonprofit status, can be used to prevent firm exploitation of consumer biases. We thus identify a governance strategy of shaping the incentives of firm management through assignment of ownership of the firm, rather than a regulatory strategy of dictating contractual terms or processes, as a way to reduce the social costs that result from consumer biases.
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In a typical investor-owned firm, ownership rights are given to those who provide equity capital to the firm; equity owners enjoy both control rights (exercised through the firm's governance institutions) and the right to the residual financial flows of the firm. These owners have strong incentives to direct or incentivize firm managers to use contractual terms that generate greater payments from consumers who suffer from biases in decision making. We will refer to contractual terms that take advantage of consumer mistakes as penalties. If instead ownership rights are given to the customers of the firm, as in a consumer cooperative, then the owners of the firm have much less incentive than would an investor-owner to exploit the biases of the firm's customers-they are the firm's customers. Alternatively, a firm could have no owners; that is, those with control rights over the firm could be denied residual financial claims. Nonprofit status achieves just that;
by law, nonprofit corporations are barred from distributing firm profits to those who control the firm. 5 By lowering the benefit of contracts that exploit consumer biases to those who control the firm, the absence of owners can also reduce the firm's use of such contracts. Mutually owned and nonprofit firms are thus less likely to use contracts that take advantage of consumer biases. And because non-investor-owned firms earn less revenue from exploiting their customers' mistakes, in a competitive market they must charge higher up-front prices than investor-owned firms in order to break even.
The differences between the contracts of investor-owned firms on the one hand, and mutually owned and nonprofit firms on the other, induce sorting of customers between firm ownership types based on their perceptions of their biases. Customers who believe they are relatively unbiased and therefore can avoid the penalties used by firms, including naive customers who in fact are vulnerable to these penalties, will be attracted by the low up-front prices charged by investorowned firms. In contrast, customers who are aware of their vulnerability to penalties, whom we refer to as sophisticated, will tend to patronize mutual and nonprofit firms in order to avoid paying the penalties that subsidize the low up-front prices at investor-owned firms. Our sorting theory provides a new perspective on the debate over whether mutually owned credit unions are meeting their mandate to serve those of "modest means": 6 if low-income consumers are more likely than others to be naive about their biases, then credit unions may have trouble winning them from investor-owned banks, which attract them with low up-front prices.
5 Hansmann (1980) provides a detailed analysis of the nonprofit form. 6 The Government Accountability Office found that credit unions serve a lower proportion of low-and moderateincome customers than do commercial banks (Government Accountability Office, 2003) . Representatives of the banking industry have used this finding to argue that credit unions should no longer receive an exemption from corporate income taxation. See Review of Credit Union Tax Exemption: Hearing Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) . 3 In support of our theory, we present evidence that consumer contracts offered by investor-owned firms differ from those offered by mutually owned firms in the consumer financial services market.
We find that mutuals charge lower penalties, such as default interest rates, and higher up-front prices, such as introductory interest rates, than do investor-owned firms.
Our theory suggests that customer-owned and nonprofit firms may thrive in markets in which consumer biases are important. Consumer financial services markets are perhaps the best application, since credit unions, mutual savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and mutual insurance companies have substantial market share and consumer biases play a large role in household financial decision-making. 7 Other markets in which mutuals and nonprofits play major roles and in which consumer biases may be important include education and health care. Factors other than consumer vulnerability to exploitation, of course, also influence the prevalence of ownership types in different markets. For example, because mutual and nonprofit firms cannot raise outside equity capital, they may be less prevalent in capital-intensive industries.
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Policies that expand the share of mutual and nonprofit firms in markets in which consumer biases cause social costs or undesirable redistribution may be normatively attractive, even if, as some scholars believe, such firms tend to operate less efficiently than do investor-owned firms. For example, policies that expand the role of credit unions in mortgage origination may reduce the opportunistic behavior of lenders vis-á-vis unsophisticated borrowers, which Bar-Gill (2009) argues has plagued the subprime mortgage market. Our analysis also provides a potential justification for regulators to disallow conversions of mutual thrifts and credit unions to investor-owned banks.
Our work brings together two different literatures: (1) work on the role of firm ownership in mitigating incentives for opportunism with respect to some class of firm patrons (i.e., providers of some input to the firm, or purchasers of the firm's output); and (2) work on the implications of consumer biases for market contracts. Hansmann (1980 Hansmann ( , 1996 's seminal work on non-investor-owned firms, on which we build, puts particular emphasis on the roles of market power and information asymmetries between the firm and some class of patrons of the firm as rationales for ownership of 7 Campbell (2006) reviews evidence of the ways in which actual household financial decision making falls short of the rational model. 8 For example, consider the cell phone service market. Grubb (2008) argues that the pricing structure commonly used by cell phone service companies, in which a particular quantity is included for a flat fee, followed by high prices for additional minutes, results from consumer overconfidence in their estimation of their demand. However, mutual cell phone service companies do not exist in the United States, presumably because such a firm would have trouble raising the substantial capital necessary to build a cell network. 4 the firm by that class of patrons. Similarly, Hart and Moore (1998) compare consumer cooperatives to outside ownership and argue that, for competitive markets, the investor-owned firm weakly dominates the cooperative, which may make inefficient investment decisions, but that a cooperative may be more efficient than an investor-owned firm if the firm has market power. We argue that the inability of investor-owned firms to commit to not exploit consumer biases is another important motivation for ownership of the firm by its customers and for nonprofit status.
Our model is also related to Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) , who analyze an entrepreneur's decision to start a nonprofit business rather than a for-profit business. They model nonprofit status as a means of committing to deliver higher values of non-contractible product quality ex post, by lowering the payoff from shading on quality. We model mutual and nonprofit ownership in a similar way, but focus on its ability to mitigate commitment problems posed by consumer biases rather than non-contractibility. An important difference between our analysis and their model is that we show how mutual status affects the form of contracts themselves, not just the non-contractible aspects (e.g., quality of service rendered) of the relationship between firm and consumer.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple model of how firm ownership can be used by firms as a commitment device to avoid offering contracts that exploit consumer biases. In Section 3 we offer evidence on the differences between the contracts used by investorowned and mutually owned firms in the consumer financial services market as well as additional corroborating evidence. Section 4 concludes.
THE MODEL
Though our theory is meant to apply to a variety of consumer biases and markets, for ease of exposition we have written the model using the example of consumers in the market for some type of financial service account (e.g., a deposit account, credit card, mortgage, etc.) who are vulnerable to penalties due to a self-control problem.
2.1. Setup. Suppose that each of an infinite number of potential banks can provide the account at the same cost, normalized to 0. Each bank can choose contract offers composed of a base price, p, which is observed by potential customers, as well as a non-negative penalty,p, which is not observed by potential customers. By base price, we refer to account features that are highly salient to customers, such as the annual or monthly fees, credit card reward programs, deposit account 5 interest rates, and credit card introductory interest rates. The base price could be negative, in which case the bank is paying customers for opening and using accounts. By penalty, we refer to account charges that are (1) hard for consumers to observe and understand, because the services being contracted for and the contracts themselves are complex (there could be many penalties, the importance of which is difficult to evaluate, buried in the fine print); and (2) more likely to be incurred if the customer is subject to some bias such as a self-control problem. Examples of penalties include late fees for missing a minimum payment and the default interest rate for credit cards, and fees for falling below a minimum balance for deposit accounts. For concreteness, we will focus on late fees. We will refer to a vector p = (p,p) ∈ R 2 as a contract.
2.1.1. Consumer behavior. We assume that all of a continuum of consumers of unit mass value account services at more than banks' production costs, so that it is efficient for all consumers to open an account. Consumers' valuations v of account services are distributed in the population according to the pdf g(·), with corresponding cdf G(·).
Each consumer suffers from a behavioral bias, which for concreteness we will describe as a selfcontrol problem, which results in a cost c > 0 to paying on time and avoiding a penalty. The extent of consumers' self-control problem varies, so that c is distributed in the population according to the pdf f (·), with corresponding strictly increasing cdf F(·). c is a reduced form way of modeling the self-control problem that leads consumers to incur penalties. A consumer with cost c facing a penaltyp will pay on time if and only if c <p.
Each consumer's c is initially unknown to the consumer. Instead, each consumer initially has a (potentially inaccurate) belief about his c, which is denoted byc.c represents consumers' long-run estimate of their bias type. The difference betweenc and c measures the extent to which consumers remain naive, despite their accumulated experience.
All consumers make decisions about whether to accept an offered contract as ifc is their true cost of paying on time. 9 For simplicity, we assume thatc is distributed identically to and independently of c. 10 Consumers for whomc = c thus have correct beliefs about their c. We refer to consumers 9 This is analogous to O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001)'s approach to incorporating partial naiveté into a (β, δ) model of time inconsistent preferences. They assume that a partially naive consumer's actual behavior in future periods is governed by the parameters (β, δ), but that the consumer believes her preferences will be governed by (β, δ) withβ > β.
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Independence of beliefs about the cost of paying on time and the true cost of paying on time is an unrealistic assumption-consumers' beliefs about their difficulty in paying on time are surely somewhat correlated with their actual self-control problem-but it substantially simplifies the analysis of the model. We consider below how relaxing this assumption would change our results.
with beliefsc ≈ c ≈ 0 as unbiased. Unbiased consumers are not subject to a bias, and they know it.
We refer to biased consumers with beliefsc ≈ c > 0 as sophisticated. Sophisticated consumers are subject to a self-control problem (high c) and are aware of the extent of their problem. In contrast, biased consumers withc < c and c > 0 are naive and underestimate the degree to which they are vulnerable to incurring penalties. Finally, consumers withc > c, whom we refer to as paranoids, overestimate the degree to which they are vulnerable to incurring penalties. We assume that firms do not know consumers' types (either c orc) and therefore cannot discriminate among consumers directly on the basis of their type.
We model consumers' difficulty in observing and understanding penalties simply as all consumers not knowing thep offered by different banks.
11 However, in equilibrium consumers have rational expectations about each bank'sp. In a recent study, the GAO conducted interviews with consumers to determine how well they understand key aspects of their credit card contracts. They found that consumers often fail to understand, inter alia, default interest rates and other penalty rate increases, late payment fees, and grace periods. Government Accountability Office (2006a). These findings provide support for our admittedly stylized assumption that consumers do not observep.
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In an earlier version of the paper we instead assumed that mutuals are subject to no agency costs between customerowners and managers and offer the budget balancing contract preferred by their median customer, which yielded qualitatively similar results. The only significant difference that results from this alternative approach is that a budgetbalancing mutual monopolist avoids the deadweight loss associated with monopoly pricing by an investor-owned firm.
13
Nonprofits are legally different than mutuals-nonprofits do not have owners in the sense that they are legally prohibited from distributing earnings to those who control the firm, while customers enjoy both control of and residual financial claims in mutuals. However, collective action problems likely result in substantial agency costs in mutuals, Importantly, while we model mutual ownership as changing the incentives facing firm management, investor-owners of firms cannot simply choose low-powered incentives for their management as a perfect substitute for mutual ownership. Investor-owned banks face a fundamental commitment problem in that their residual claimants have an incentive to manage the firm to maximize profits, including profits from penalties. Furthermore, customers are aware of this commitment problem in the model and thus would not believe an investor-owned firm that claimed to be using low-powered incentives and low penalties.
14 Mutual ownership solves this commitment problem by removing the outside residual claimant. There are surely alternative commitment devices, such as reputational mechanisms, but we think these are imperfect at best.
While managers can reap pecuniary benefits from charging penalties, they face costs from extracting penalty revenue. For each customer of the bank, bank management incurs a non-cash (e.g., effort) cost ψ(p) from choosing a penaltyp, with ψ (·) ≥ 0, ψ (0) = 0, and
is a reduced form way to represent costs due to regulatory constraints and to the managerial effort and psychic costs (e.g., it is unpleasant for the manager because of social preferences) required to charge and extract large penalties from customers. To simplify, we assume ψ(p) is incurred per customer (whether or not the customer triggers the penalty) so that a firm's optimal choice ofp is not a function of the scale of the firm. We assume the same cost function ψ(·) applies regardless of the ownership structure of the firm. which lack a market for firm control and other institutions that mitigate agency costs between managers and owners of investor-owned firms.
14 Compensation of firm managers is complex, involving not just explicit contractual incentive schemes, but also implicit subjective rewards such as promotions and raises. Given this complexity, investor-owned firms would have trouble convincing consumers that their managers truly face low-powered incentives.
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While our model is a one-shot contracting model, the model could be extended to allow, say, another contracting stage following the current model. While consumers learn thep of their contract in the first stage, this would not allow them to observe the penalties in a new contract, or the penalties offered by other firms. Consumers also, in our model, perfectly learn their c following contracting. If this type were persistent and consumers did not forget their type, then contracting in the second stage would be different. However, we think ofc as representing consumers' 2.2. Equilibrium concept. We first define a condition that contracts' penalties must satisfy in equilibrium. Since the penaltyp charged under a contract is unobserved by the bank's customers, the bank choosesp to maximize penalty revenue net of penalty costs per customer (with penalty revenue deflated by d if the bank is a mutual) and does not take into account the effect of penalties on demand. More formally, the bank's contracts must satisfy the following penalty optimality condition.
Definition 1. A bank offering contract (p,p) satisfies penalty optimality ifp is a solution to the following problem:
(1) max
where δ = 1 for investor-owned banks and δ = d < 1 for mutuals.
The first order condition for the problem in (1),
implicitly defines the solution to (1) as a function of δ; denote that functionp * (δ). Furthermore, to simplify notation definep io ≡p * (1) andp m ≡p * (d).
We now have the intuitive result:
Lemma 1. Mutuals charge lower penalties than investor-owned banks (p m <p io ).
All proofs are in the Appendix.
The intuition for why mutuals charge lower penalties is straightforward: while mutual managers face the same non-cash cost function for using penalties, ψ(·), they keep only a fraction d < 1 of the monetary benefits from penalties that would accrue to an investor-owner. Consequently, their optimal level of penalties is lower.
Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , a long-run competitive equilibrium will be a set of contracts for each firm type (i.e., investor-owned banks and mutuals) such that, when consumers choose the contract that maximizes their expected utility with rational (i.e., correct) expectations about each contract's penalties, (1) each equilibrium contract satisfies penalty optimality for the long-run estimate of their bias type, and of naiveté as persisting despite consumers' experience of their own biases. If consumers' do not updatec, then the dynamic model reduces to a repeated static game.
firm type that offers it; (2) all equilibrium contracts make nonnegative expected profits; and (3) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set such that, if it were offered, it would attract customers, make a nonnegative profit, and satisfy penalty optimality for some firm type. As usual, each equilibrium contract will make zero expected profits given free entry and perfect competi-
tion. In what follows, we ignore any contracts that if offered would attract no customers. Below we consider first equilibria in which only investor-owned banks can enter in the market, and then consider equilibria in which mutual banks can enter and compete with investor-owned banks.
It will be useful in what follows to define a long-run per-customer profit function π(p). This function is
Formally, our equilibrium concept is as follows:
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium is a set of investor-owned bank contracts P * io and, if mutuals are allowed to enter, a set of mutual contracts P * m (with the set of all equilibrium contracts denoted P * ≡ P * io ∪ P * m ), such that
(1) For all contracts p * ∈ P * , p * satisfies penalty optimality (2) Nonnegative profits: for all p * ∈ P * , π(p * ) ≥ 0 (3) Free entry: There does not exist a contract p such that (a) There exists a customer typec that strictly prefers p to all contracts in P * (b) p satisfies penalty optimality either for a investor-owned bank or, if mutuals are allowed to enter, for a mutual bank; and (c) Nonnegative profits: π(p ) ≥ 0 2.3. Equilibrium with only investor-owned banks. Suppose that only investor-owned banks can enter. We now have the following result:
There is a unique competitive equilibrium with investor-owned banks with a single equilibrium contract given by p *
With only investor-owned banks competing, the equilibrium involves pooling on a single contract involving a high penalty and low base price. Consumers who are subject to self-control 10 problems (i.e., who have high c) thus subsidize banking services for the unbiased (i.e, those with low c), who receive services at below cost.
The inability of investor-owned banks to sort customers into different contracts is due to a commitment problem: investor-owned banks cannot commit to offering lower penalties since customers have trouble understanding penalties. If instead there was a commitment device for investor-owned banks (say via reputation) then a sorting equilibrium could potentially exist with only investor-owned banks.
2.4. Equilibrium with investor-owned and mutual banks. Suppose now mutual banks can enter and compete with investor-owned banks.
Proposition 2. There is a unique competitive equilibrium with investor-owned banks and mutuals in which:
(1) There is a single contract offered by investor-owned banks,
and a single contract offered by mutuals,
(2) Mutuals charge a lower penalty, and a higher base price, than do investor-owned banks.
(3) There exists ac * ∈ (p m ,p io ) such that consumers withc <c * prefer to use investor-owned banks and consumers withc >c * prefer to use mutuals.
In an equilibrium with mutuals and investor-owned banks competing, mutuals charge higher base prices than investor-owned banks. The reason is that they make less money on penalties and thus must raise their base prices in order to break even.
Consumers with relatively lowc prefer to obtain an account at investor-owned banks rather than mutuals. These consumers do not expect to be hit with penalties, since they believe their cost of avoiding penalties is low, and so find investor-owned banks' low base prices and high penalties attractive. Some of these consumers, however, are naive and have high true cost of avoiding penalties, and as a result incur the penalty. Thus, naive consumers with self-control problems subsidize unbiased consumers at investor-owned banks.
In contrast, consumers with highc avoid investor-owned banks, since they fear being hit with large penalties (or incurring large costs to avoid being hit with penalties). Those who also have high c are subject to a self-control problem but are sophisticated about it and use mutuals to avoid paying the high penalties at investor-owned banks. Paranoid consumers with highc but low c 11 mistakenly fear the high penalties at investor-owned banks, but would be better off if they switched to investor-owned banks and enjoyed the subsidy from naive consumers.
2.5. The effect of mutuals. The equilibrium with mutuals competing with investor-owned banks results in better outcomes for consumers than the equilibrium with just investor-owned banks. In particular, mutuals can result in an efficient expansion of utilization of financial services, less crosssubsidization of unbiased consumers by consumers with self control problems, and more efficient late payment behavior. We also consider in this section the situation in which, contrary to our assumptions in the model, consumer biases result in consumption of services by consumers who value them at less than their cost and argue that mutuals offer a potential partial solution to this problem. Finally, we argue that mutuals have greater incentives than do investor-owned banks to educate consumers about their biases.
2.5.1. Underutilization of financial services. Recall that we assumed that all consumers value account services at greater than their cost of production. While stylized, this assumption seems plausible as an approximation to the first best for many financial services, including credit cards and deposit accounts. However, with only investor-owned banks competing, a consumer will only obtain an account if she values it at more than the price she perceives for it, including her expected costs from penalties. More formally, she will obtain an account if and only if
For some consumers with high perceived cost of avoiding penalties and relatively low valuation of the account, this condition fails. These consumers inefficiently stay out of the financial services market despite the subsidized base price because they expect to pay large penalties.
In contrast, with mutual banks competing with investor-owned banks, a consumer will obtain an account if her perceived price for either the mutual or the investor-owned contract is less than her valuation of the account. Formally, the condition is now
Because mutuals charge lower penalties, some consumers who would have inefficiently stayed out of the market had only investor-owned firms offered the financial service will now enter the market 12 and go to a mutual bank. The right hand side of (5) is weakly lower than the right hand side of (4), and strictly lower for consumers with sufficiently highc.
More intuitively, consider a consumer who is wary of being taken advantage of by an investorowned bank and therefore stays out of the market when that is the only option. If a mutually owned bank enters the market, he may then be willing to open an account there because he trusts the mutual not to exploit him. The presence of mutuals can thus result in an efficient expansion of financial service utilization.
2.5.2. Overutilization of financial services. Suppose instead that there are some consumers who value the service at less than their social costs. For example, consider a consumer who should not take out a mortgage because she will likely default, which results in high social and private costs. Consumer naiveté about their biases can result in overconsumption of the service in such a situation. In terms of the model, we can have v > p +c so that the consumer values the service at greater than her perceived cost but v < p +p, c >p, and v < 0 so that the consumer underestimates her cost of avoiding the high penalty and is inefficiently utilizing the service. In the consumer loan market, such behavior by firms is often referred to as "predatory lending."
In our model, the introduction of mutuals cannot address overutilization. While such consumers would face higher perceived prices at mutuals, investor-owned banks continue to offer low base prices and attract such consumers. Predatory lending can thus persist in a market with mutuals competing with investor-owned banks. Our model illustrates the limitations of mutuals in curing inefficiencies that arise from consumer biases. Mutuals generally can only help consumers who choose to patronize them, and when consumers are naive about their vulnerability to exploitation by investor-owned firms, they may fail to use mutuals.
However, if we change some assumptions of the model, mutuals can mitigate this problem of overutilization through three channels. First, while the introduction of mutuals does not change the pricing decisions of investor-owned banks in the model due to the assumption that c andc are them. This reduction in penalties would be accompanied by a rise in base prices in order for investor-owned banks to break even. Through this effect on the contracts offered by investorowned banks, mutuals could in theory reduce the number of consumers who inefficiently consume financial services. Such an effect seems likely to be relatively modest, however.
Second, as we discuss in Section 2.5.5, mutuals have an incentive to educate consumers about their biases. The introduction of mutuals can thus result in the "sophisticating" of some consumers who otherwise would fall victim to predatory lending.
Third, while in the model consumers sort between mutuals and investor-owned banks solely oñ c, in reality there are substantial search costs and other factors that determine where consumers bank. Thus, a consumer who, if she went to an investor-owned bank, would inefficiently utilize the financial service may instead bank at a mutual and, faced with a higher base price, be dissuaded from using the service. Sophisticated and paranoid consumers go to mutuals, which offer lower penalties and therefore engage in less cross-subsidization among consumer types. At mutuals, relatively biased consumers do better, and relatively unbiased consumers do worse, than they do at investor-owned banks.
2.5.4. Penalty-incurring behavior. In the model it is efficient for all consumers who face any costs to paying on time (c > 0) to pay late. 17 With only investor-owned banks offering accounts, however, consumers face a pricep io > 0 to paying late, resulting in inefficiency. In contrast, with mutuals competing with investor-owned banks, consumers who bank at mutuals face a lower price, p m <p io , to paying late, reducing this distortion in late payment behavior.
As a more significant example, consider prepayment penalties in mortgage contracts, which charge a fee if the borrower pays off the loan before some specified period. These may exploit borrowers' underestimation of their likelihood of selling their home or refinancing, and their presence in mortgage contracts may inefficiently deter borrowers from selling their homes. If mutuals 16 "Stickness" in where consumers bank would also have an effect on other types of consumers. For example, sophisticates may fail to take advantage of mutuals when they should if there are large search costs. 17 The assumption that being paid late is costless to the firm is simply a normalization; the conclusions of this section apply even if firms face positive costs from penalty-incurring behavior. 14 charge prepayment penalties less, as our theory predicts, then the presence of mutuals in the market would result in more efficient home sales behavior by borrowers.
2.5.5. Education of consumers by firms. A natural question is whether firms can win customers by educating their competitors' customers about their biases and consequent vulnerability to penalties.
18 Suppose firms could educate consumers so that they understood the true extent of their behavioral biases. Formally, suppose firms could change consumers'c so that theirc = c, but cannot target consumers with particularc or c since they do not observe consumers' types. 19 Furthermore, suppose that firm managers of all types of firms ceteris paribus would like to serve more customers (for example, suppose the market is not perfectly competitive).
The effect of being "sophisticated" in this way would be to move erstwhile naives from investorowned banks to mutuals, and paranoid consumers who overestimate their vulnerability to penalties from mutuals to investor-owned banks. We think it is likely that naives are a substantially larger share of the population than are paranoids-on average consumers underestimate the extent of their self-control problems. Furthermore, paranoid consumers would be relatively unprofitable for investor-owned banks since they can avoid penalties at relatively low cost. This analysis would then suggest that mutuals would, and investor-owned banks would not, have an incentive to educate consumers about their likelihood of incurring fees. If this is true, then policies that encourage the growth of mutual firms are a form of "debiasing through law" as analyzed by Jolls and Sunstein (2006) -law could actually reduce the naiveté of consumers rather than just insulate them from its effects.
18 Gabaix and Laibson (2006) consider this possibility by allowing firms to costlessly convert some fraction of naive consumers into unbiased consumers. However, they show that firms are subject to a "curse of debiasing": debiased customers prefer to continue to patronize firms with high penalties since debiased consumers can now avoid those penalties and enjoy a subsidy from the remaining naive customers at firms with high penalties. Consequently, competition may not provide an incentive for firms to educate consumers about (easily avoidable) hidden penalties. However, we think that many of the relevant consumer biases, such as self-control problems, are not so easily cured. Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2008) show that in the month following being charged a fee on their credit card account, consumers are 40% less likely to incur another fee than their baseline probability. However, their likelihood of incurring a fee increases as the period since they last incurred a fee increases. This serves as evidence that it is difficult for many consumers to correct the biases that lead them to incur penalties. In contrast, consumers' knowledge of their self-control problem seems plausibly changeable.
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We do not define education as an action that revealsp because many contracts are inherently difficult to understand so that disclosure, though it might alert consumers to particular prices and contract features, cannot convincingly inform consumers that no other important prices or features lie buried in fine print.
EVIDENCE
The consumer financial services market is an appealing context in which to test our theory because existing research argues that consumer biases play an important role in determining the form of consumer financial contracts and both investor-owned and mutual firms compete in the market.
We begin this section by providing a brief background on credit unions, which are the mutually owned financial institutions that form the basis of our quantitative evidence. We then present evidence that the contracts used by credit unions charge lower penalties and higher base prices than those of investor-owned firms; Section 3.2 examines credit cards while 3.3 examines deposit accounts. In Section 3.4 we offer additional evidence for our theory from executive compensation, marketing materials, and the types of customers at credit unions and investor-owned banks. Finally, we consider alternative explanations for our empirical findings in Section 3.5.
3.1. Background on credit unions. While investor-owned firms provide the bulk of consumer financial services today, non-investor-owned firms, including credit unions and mutual thrifts, remain significant financial service providers. that are used to exploit consumers' mistakes will be less prevalent in credit union contracts than in the contracts of investor-owned firms, such as commercial banks.
While ownership is in our view the most important difference between credit unions and investorowned financial service institutions, there are several other institutional differences. For one, credit unions must have a "common bond," such as a common employer, among their members.
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Many credit unions have employer-based common bonds, including many that are public sector employer-based. However, this common bond requirement has been progressively loosenedgeographic-based common bonds such as "lives in Fairfax County" 27 are now common, 28 and in 1998 federal law was changed to allow a credit union to serve multiple groups.
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Furthermore, unlike investor-owned firms, credit unions are exempt from corporate income taxation. 30 And credit unions are subject to a few differences in regulatory treatment, most notably a cap of 18% on the interest rate that federal credit unions can charge members. 31 Otherwise, they operate under regulations similar to investor-owned banks. 32 We consider in Section 3.5 whether the common bond requirement, tax treatment, or interest rate cap of credit unions, rather than customer ownership, explain the differences we document in the contracts they offer.
3.2. Credit cards. We now compare the credit card contracts offered by credit unions to those offered by investor-owned issuers. Existing research has identified ways in which credit card issuers fashion contracts that exploit the mistakes that consumers make. When consumers have time inconsistent preferences and are naive about their self control problem, they will generally underestimate their future credit card-financed consumption. Bar-Gill (2004) 28 To qualify for such a "community charter," credit unions must serve a "well-defined local community, neighborhood or district." 12 U.S.C. §1759(b)(3). However, the National Credit Union Administration has interpreted this statutory language liberally to include any city or country, or any Metropolitan Statistical Area with population below one million. See, National Credit Union Administration, Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 2-42 -2-43 (2003 components of price above marginal cost and lowering the up-front charges like annual fees and per-transaction charges. Consumers' biases can thus explain the high interest rates, low annual and per transaction fees, introductory teaser rates, high late and over-the-limit fees, and rewards programs characteristic of credit card contracts. Mapping these contract features into the terms of our model, the existing literature predicts that annual fees, introductory rates, and rewards programs are components of the base price, while the standard purchase interest rate, default interest rate, and late and over-the-limit fees are components of the contracts' penalties.
Both investor-owned lenders and credit unions issue credit cards. Though investor-owned issuers make up the bulk of credit card lending by volume in the United States, credit unions constitute a large fraction of lenders in the market. According to The Card Industry Directory (2006), 58 of the top 100 credit card lenders in the country by lending volume were credit unions. Our theory predicts that the credit cards issued by credit unions will exhibit fewer of the contract features that exploit consumer biases and will instead have a flatter profile of up-front and borrowing-contingent prices.
3.2.1. Data. Our credit card contract data come from Bankrate.com, which surveys a sample of credit card issuers weekly about their contract offers. We obtained the Bankrate credit card survey data for the first week of July, 2008. We eliminated duplicate observations as well as observations with missing contract terms. 33 In addition, we eliminated a small number of cards that appeared to be charge cards rather than credit cards. 34 We were left with 310 distinct cards, issued by 65 distinct lenders. Of those cards, 76 are issued by credit unions, and of the 65 lenders, 19 are credit unions. Table 1 contains information on the size and nature of the dataset after each round of elimination. Table 2 contains the name of every credit card issuer in the analysis sample.
3.2.2. Analysis. We begin with a simple comparison of mean contract terms. Table 3 shows that the contracts of investor-owned issuers and mutuals are quite different. Panel A compares the base prices that the existing literature predicts firms compete on and thus our theory predicts will be lower at investor-owned issuers. The results are largely consistent with this prediction. Investorowned issuers are far more likely than credit unions to offer introductory APRs (annual percentage 33 We eliminated all contracts that did not differ from any other contract by the name of the issuer or any features of the card. 34 Charge cards do not allow customers to borrow beyond the one-month billing cycle and hence are not comparable to credit cards. Our criterion for identifying charge cards was a listed non-introductory purchase APR of 0%.
rate-a standardized measure of the interest rate) that are lower than their standard purchase APRs, and the mean introductory APR is significantly lower at investor-owned issuers. 35 Similarly, we find that 49% of all investor-owned issuer cards have rewards programs, compared to only 17% of credit union cards.
Credit unions do have lower annual fees on average. This result, however, is driven by a few outliers (the median annual fee for both credit union cards and investor-owned issuer cards is $0) and is small in dollar terms when compared with other contract features.
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Panel B compares the penalty contract terms that the existing literature has identifed as used to exploit consumer biases. Our theory predicts that investor-owned issuers will charge higher penalties in their credit card contracts. Again, the results line up well with this prediction. Credit unions on average have slightly lower purchase APRs, far lower default APRs, 37 and provide longer grace periods. 38 Credit unions also charge lower late and over-the-limit fees than do investor-owned issuers.
Figure 2 depicts these contract differences graphically. Plotted from left to right are the mean introductory, purchase, and default APRs of the credit union and investor-owned subgroups. This profile of interest rates has a substantial slope for the investor-owned subgroup, beginning with low introductory APRs and ending with high default APRs. In contrast, the profile of credit union interest rates is much flatter, with fewer subsidized introductory APRs and much lower default APRs.
A potential concern with a simple comparison of means is that credit unions and investor-owned issuers may systematically differ on dimensions that affect contract terms but are not consequences of ownership type, resulting in omitted variables bias. We therefore perform a regression analysis using a set of controls. One potentially important control is firm size: credit unions have on average 35 All rates are calculated for the entire sample, unconditional on offering an introductory or default APR distinct from the standard purchase APR. Differences are also significant and in the same direction for rates calculated conditional on offering distinct introductory and default APRs (not reported). 36 Figures from Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2008) suggest that the average credit card holder pays approximately $121 per year in fees (late fees, over the limit fees, and cash advance fees) not including interest later accrued on such fees. This amount alone swamps annual fees, and it does not include what is perhaps the largest source of credit card penalty income: default APRs. 37 Default APRs are interest rates that are triggered following a late payment on the current card or, in the case of "universal default" provisions, on other debt of the borrower. 38 The grace period is the number of days a borrower has from the statement date to pay the bill in full without incurring a finance charge (and, potentially, a late fee).
much lower lending volume than investor-owned issuers. We use the log of lending volume, taken from The Card Industry Directory (2006), as a control.
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Furthermore, credit unions may serve a somewhat different pool of customers than investorowned issuers because of their common bond membership requirements. These customer differences could in theory result in different equilibrium contracts. For example, if credit union members are on average much more risk averse than the customers of investor-owned credit card issuers, then they may demand lower penalties, which add risk to the contract. 40 We thus include controls that proxy for customer composition. Although the Bankrate data do not contain any direct information on borrowers, we do have data on card type (Gold, Platinum, Student, Business, and Secured), which is a coarse proxy for borrower characteristics such as creditworthiness.
41
To measure the effect of mutual ownership we estimate the following equation:
where Y c f is a given term of the contract c offered by firm f , X cf is a vector of controls, CU f is an indicator for whether the firm is a credit union, λ f is a firm-specific error term, and c f is a contract-specific error term. Table 4 presents results in column 2 from regressions controlling for card type indicators and log lending volume, along with the raw differences again in column 1 for ease of comparison. We find that the overall pattern of coefficients is unchanged by the controls. For instance, adding the controls changes the coefficient on credit union from 2.64 to 2.67 with introductory APR as the dependent variable, from -1.52 to -1.03 with purchase APR, and from -11.16 to -9.29 with default APR. In sum, controlling for all observables available to us does not change our results.
Because there are several very large investor-owned issuers that are orders of magnitude larger than any credit union in our sample, these results may be dependent on our parametric assumptions about the functional form of the relationship between firm size and contract terms. For this reason we use a matching estimator, focusing on a subgroup of contracts for which there is overlap between the covariate distributions in the credit union and investor-owned subgroups. 42 Because the support of the covariate distribution for the credit union subgroup is contained in the support of the covariate distribution of the investor-owned subgroup, we estimate the Population Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (PATT), where credit unions are the treatment group (and investorowned issuers are the controls). 43 The PATT estimand represents the causal effect of being a credit union rather than investor-owned for credit unions that actually exist in the population. We use three control (investor-owned) matches for every treatment (credit union) observation. We match exactly on card type, and then approximately on firm lending volume. 3.3. Deposit accounts. We next examine deposit account contracts. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) argue that banks shroud many of the fees they charge on deposit accounts, such as bounced check fees and minimum balance fees, and set those fees above marginal cost to exploit myopic consumers. Our theory predicts that such fees at mutually owned banks should be lower than at investor-owned banks. We investigate whether this is true using data on account fees at credit unions and investor-owned banks. The GAO was contractually obligated not to share the underlying data with us, but it did provide us with variable means for the credit union subgroup and the bank and savings and loan association (S&L) subgroup. S&Ls include some mutually owned S&Ls, but the vast majority are stockowned. Despite this contamination by mutuals, we consider the bank and S&L subgroup to be our investor-owned subgroup; the presence of mutuals in the bank and S&L subgroup will bias our results towards no difference. Because we do not have access to the underlying data we cannot provide standard errors. However, the very large sample sizes suggest that the differences we present are statistically significant. 3.3.2. Analysis. Table 5 shows that for a wide variety of deposit account fees, investor-owned banks and S&Ls charge more than credit unions. 44 Shrouded prices that likely take advantage of consumer myopia, such as Non-Sufficient Funds Fees, Overdraft Fees, and monthly fees assessed when the account balance falls below a minimum threshold, show a clear pattern of being higher at investor-owned banks than credit unions. The only fee for which credit unions consistently charge more is the "Return of Deposited Item" fee, which is charged when a customer attempts to deposit a bad check written by someone else.
However, it is not clear what the components of the base price are for deposit accounts, and none of account features in the GAO data are good candidates. Given that investor-owned firms successfully compete with credit unions to attract customers, it is likely that they offer superior terms or features on at least some component of their deposit accounts, but we lack data on those account features.
3.4. Additional evidence. Additional corroborating evidence for our theory can be found in differences in the marketing materials and executive compensation of customer-owned and investorowned banks. We also provide some suggestive evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances that customers sort between firm types according to their perceptions of their biases, as our theory predicts.
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The Moebs and Informa data had different sampling strategies (Moebs was designed to be nationally representative, while Informa was not) which may explain the differences in the point estimates. 
Executive compensation. Our theory focuses on the incentives that investor-owners have to
use contracts that exploit consumers' mistakes. However, investor-owners typically elect directors who hire managers to set firm policy and provide incentive contracts for those managers in addition to explicit directives. In practice, one proximate cause of the differences in behavior between ownership types may be differences in these compensation contracts of firm managers, with investor-owners providing their hired managers with higher-powered incentives than the directors of mutual firms give to their managers (as we model). Confirming these hypothesized differences in executive compensation thus provides supporting evidence for our theory. 45 Examining the 2005 America's Community Bankers Compensation Survey, Mazur (2005) finds that the highest-paid employee of investor-owned banks was paid on average $237,102, 45% of which was in bonus and profit-sharing payments. In contrast, among mutual savings banks, 46 the highest-paid employee was paid on average $178,726, only 24% of which was in bonus and profit-sharing payments. Moreover, while 35% of investor-owned banks had an employee stock 45 However, our theory does not predict that firm ownership causes differences in firm behavior only through the incentive pay contracts of managers. Incentive pay contracts are in theory used to align the interests of managers and owners with respect to the unobservable actions of managers. For observable actions, owners (or their representatives) can directly dictate the choices of managers. For example, a board of directors may mandate that the CEO adopt a rewards program for the firm's credit card products. Firm ownership can affect these choices too.
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Mutual savings banks are in fact nonprofits and are not owned by their customers. See footnote 25, supra.
ownership plan, only 10% of mutual banks had a phantom stock program or similar scheme designed to produce incentives similar to stock-based compensation. Similarly, the Credit Union National Association 2004-2005 CEO Total Compensation Survey found that the average credit union CEO cash compensation was $189,432 of which only 14.5% was in bonus and incentive payments (Molvig, 2005) . It thus appears that investor-owned issuers do indeed use higher-power incentive contracts to compensate their top executives than do mutuals.
3.4.3. Customer sorting according to perceptions of bias. Our theory predicts that differences in the contracts offered by mutually owned and investor-owned firms should induce a particular type of sorting. Both unbiased and naive consumers should be attracted by contracts offered by investorowned firms since they are not concerned about being subject to penalties, while sophisticated and paranoid consumers should be attracted by mutuals. Consumer perceptions of their vulnerability to penalties (c in the model), not their true vulnerability (c in the model), determine consumers' choices between investor-owned and mutual firms.
We test these predictions using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, merged from the surveys from 1989-2004. We proxy for consumers' perception of the cost of avoiding penalties using the response to the following question: "What is the most important reason your family living here chose the institution that you did for your main checking account?" WantLowFee i is an indicator for whether the respondent chose "low fees or service charges" as the most important reason for choosing their checking account institution. We consider this a proxy for consumers' perceived cost of avoiding fees because fees are unimportant unless the account holder believes there is a positive probability of incurring them. 15.4% of checking account holders in the data chose low fees and service charges as their most important reason.
We proxy for consumers' actual cost of avoiding penalties using outstanding credit card balances, collapsed to a binary variable. CarryBal i is an indicator for whether credit card holders ran a non-zero balance in the month prior to survey. 54.3% of cardholders in the data carry a non-zero balance.
We first estimate a probit model of the form
where CUCheck * i is the underlying latent variable determining CUCheck i , which is an indicator for whether the household has its primary checking account at a credit union, and X i is a vector of controls including sex, age, age 2 , race, education, income, industry, occupation, and year of survey.
The results, reported in column (1) of Table 6 , confirm that people concerned about fees are indeed more likely to hold a checking account at a credit union than those who do not. We take this as evidence supporting our basic sorting hypothesis: sophisticated and paranoid consumers who are worried about their vulnerability to penalties are more likely to use mutuals.
We next check whether concern about fees and service charges and carrying a credit card balance is correlated with credit union credit card use. 47 We estimate probit models of the form
where CUCC i is an indicator for whether the household has its primary credit card at a credit union.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 report estimates of (8) for the subgroups with and without credit union checking accounts, respectively. 48 Carrying a credit card balance has no statistically signficiant association with holding a credit union credit card for either subgroup. 49 This is somewhat surprising but is consistent with our assumption in the model that c andc are uncorrelated. More generally, it is evidence of naiveté among consumers about their vulnerability to penalties as those who are most vulnerable (identified by their behavior of carrying a balance) are not choosing mutuals, which are less likely to exploit them. We also find that, for those without a credit union checking account, WantLowFee i has a significant correlation with using a credit union credit card.
Taken together, the above evidence suggests that consumers' perceptions of their vulnerabilty to penalties is correlated with mutual patronage, yet consumers who are most vulnerable to credit card penalties (those who carry a balance) are not more likely to use mutuals. While admittedly endogeneity and measurement issues abound, we interpret this suggestive evidence as supporting 47 While WantLowFee i is a response to a question about checking accounts, it seems likely that consumer concern about fees in checking accounts is a proxy for consumer concern about fees in other types of financial service accounts. 48 We control for having a credit union checking account because WantLowFee i could cause people to choose credit union checking accounts, and then having a credit union checking account could have an effect on whether they have a credit union credit card. 49 Without controls it does have a small, positive correlation. the predictions of our theory concerning customer sorting based on their perceived vulnerability to penalties.
3.5. Alternative explanations. We now consider several alternative explanations for the stark differences in contracts offered by customer-owned and investor-owned firms in the consumer financial services market.
3.5.1. Customer selection. Perhaps the biggest concern with our findings on contract differences is that they may be driven by the different customer selection processes of credit unions. To investigate this possibility, we examine whether people who use credit cards issued by investorowned firms are observably different from those who use credit union credit cards. In order for customer selection to be the driving force for the large differences in contracts we observe, we would expect to see substantial differences in credit union and investor-owned firm customers.
In Table 7 we compare households whose main credit card is from a credit union to those whose main credit card is from an investor-owned issuer using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) merged from 1989 to 2004. We find little difference between the demographics of the two groups. Credit union card users are on average slightly younger, more likely to be male, and more likely to have graduated from high school. There are no significant differences between groups in their proportion white, black, or college graduate.
The only demographic characteristic in which there is an appreciable difference between the groups is income: households served by credit unions make, on average, $11,134, or 16% less per year than do households with investor-owned credit cards. Furthermore, we find that people who use credit union cards are more likely to be employed than users of investor-owned issuer cards and are specifically more likely to be employed in the public sector. This is likely due to the fact that many credit unions serve only employees of a particular employer, many of which are in the public sector (e.g., the State Employees' Credit Union). Employment-based selection is only a concern if we believe selection between, say, public and private sector employment is correlated with demand for up-front prices versus penalties or with other characteristics of borrowers that result in different equilibrium contracts. We believe that most such employment-and criteriabased selection is largely orthogonal to consumers' demand for particular contract terms.
A type of consumer preference that might affect consumers' demand for different contract terms is risk preference. We investigate this possibility using data from the 1983 SCF, which contained 26 a question about risk preferences: respondents were asked whether they were willing to take "substantial," "above average," "average," or no risk at all in their investments. Figure 5 shows the histograms of responses for credit union and investor-owned bank checking account holders. 50 The patterns of responses among credit union and commercial bank customers are similar. Ordered probits predicting risk aversion responses by institution type fail to reject the null of no effect of institution type with a p-value of 0.65.
On the whole, we think it is implausible that these modest differences in customer composition reflected in the SCF explain even a small part of the large differences between investor-owned and credit union credit card contracts. Without a compelling mechanism by which criteria-based selection would be correlated with demand for different contract types, and without evidence that strong selection actually does take place, it is unlikely that the stark contract differences we find in the data are caused by differences in customer composition.
3.5.2. Tax treatment. As we noted above, credit unions are exempt from the corporate income tax. This exemption is meant to make it easier for credit unions to expand their capital stock by allowing them to retain more of their profits, thus partially compensating for their inability to raise equity capital. However, it seems unlikely that this is the cause of the differences in contracts. Smith, Cargill, and Meyer (1981) and Cook and D'Antonio (1984) argue that if credit unions were taxed they would likely lower interest rates, as corporate income tax would reduce the benefit of retaining earnings. There is no reason to expect that taxing credit unions would result in their using the low up-front prices and high penalties observed at investor-owned issuers. Indeed, our model would predict that taxes would lower the use of penalties at mutuals by lowering their pecuniary benefit to managers.
3.5.3. Interest rate caps. Federally chartered credit unions are subject to a cap of 18% on the interest rates they can charge members. In principle this could account for lower interest rates at credit unions. However, of the 76 credit card contracts in our analysis sample, only 11 charge a penalty interest rate at or above the cap, whereas 211 of the 234 investor-owned issuer contracts have penalty interest rates at or above the credit union 18% cap. If the interest rate cap were the driver of the difference, then one would expect the cap to be binding for a far greater fraction of 50 We examine checking account ownership because it was a financial product used by the majority (96.3%) of respondents in 1983, much as credit cards are today. Relatively few people (18.5%) in the 1983 sample used credit cards, and of those a mere 16 respondents used credits card issued by mutuals, making inference difficult. credit union credit cards. Moreover, there are differences in prices, such as late fees, that are not subject to the interest rate cap.
3.5.4. Innovation. One explanation for our APR results is that raising revenue via introductory and default APRs that are different from the standard purchase APR is a fairly recent innovation in credit card contracting, and perhaps mutual firms are just slower to adopt innovations than are investor-owned issuers. A similar argument is that there is a fixed cost to introducing complex contract features such as introductory and default APRs, and credit unions, which are smaller on average than commercial banks, do not find it cost-effective to do so (but note that we controlled for firm size). To investigate this, we restrict the sample to banks with introductory and default APRs distinct from their purchase APRs and find that it is still the case that credit unions offer a flatter interest rate profile than do investor-owned issuers, albeit not quite as flat as in the entire sample (results unreported).
In sum, we think that a difference in management incentives caused by firm ownership, rather than any of these alternative explanations, is the best explanation for the observed differences in contracts between investor-owned issuers and credit unions.
CONCLUSION
Firm ownership can be a socially useful device for shaping incentives in domains in which alternative modes of social control, such as regulation and market competition, may be ineffective. These domains include markets in which consumer biases result in losses to social welfare. While the evidence we have presented for our theory is confined to financial services markets, we think it is likely that firm ownership plays a similar role in attenuating firms' incentives to exploit consumer biases in other markets, such as education and health care. While mutual and nonprofit firms have a substantial presence in many markets, policies that expand the market share of mutuals may be an effective way to reduce the social costs that result from consumers' mistakes.
Furthermore, it satisfies free entry since any alternative contract that also satisfies penalty optimality and makes some consumer type strictly better off must offer a p < −[1 − F(p io )]p io + ψ(p io ) and would therefore make negative profits.
Third, this equilibrium is unique. To see this, note that all equilibrium contracts in any alternative equilibrium must havep =p io . Now note that all consumer types will buy the equilibrium contract with the lowest p, so any equilibrium must have a single contract. Now note that any equilibrium contract with p < −[1 − F(p io )]p io + ψ(p io ) would make negative profits, while any with p > −[1 − F(p io )]p io + ψ(p io ) would violate free entry.
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote the equilibrium base prices charged by investor-owned firms and mutuals as p io and p m , respectively. We first prove that the proposed equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
Penalty optimality requires all equilibrium contracts offered by investor-owned banks to usê p =p io , and those offered by mutual banks to usep =p m , which the proposed equilibrium contracts indeed satisfy.
Consider now the profits banks earn under each contract. Each consumer that accepts the contract (p,p) pays the penalty if and only if c >p. The per-customer profit generated by each equilibrium contract is thus:
The contracts thus satisfy the nonnegative profits condition. Furthermore, the proposed equilibrium contract set satisfies free entry since any alternative contract that also satisfies penalty optimality and makes some consumer type strictly better off must offer a lower base price than the equilibrium contract offered by its ownership type (investor-owned or mutual) and would therefore make negative profits.
Finally, we now show that each of the two equilibrium contracts would indeed attract customers. Consider a consumer withc >p io >p m . (That such a consumer exists can be seen by examining the optimization problem (1) which determinesp io andp m , the solutions to which clearly have 1 − F(p io ) > 0 and 1 − F(p m ) > 0 since if not then no customer would pay a penalty, yet the bank would incur the costs ψ(p), which cannot be optimal.) We want to show that such a consumer prefers the contract (p m ,p m ) to the contract (p io ,p io ). The consumer will expect to pay the penalty under either contract, so it suffices to show that −p io −p io < −p m −p m .
It will be useful to derive expressions for −p io −p io and −p m −p m :
And we thus have:
And similarly we can show that:
The following chain of inequalities yields our desired result.
It can easily be shown that the first inequality holds by ψ(p io ) > ψ(p m ), the second inequality holds by F(p io ) > F(p m ), and the third inequality holds by p io < p m (which we show in the proof of part (2) below).
To see that there exist customers who prefer the investor-owned firm contract, consider customers withc <p m who expect to pay no penalty under either contract. (That such a consumer exists can be seen by examining the optimization problem (1) which determinesp io andp m , the solutions to which clearly have 1− F(p io ) < 1 and 1− F(p m ) < 1 since ψ (0) = 0.) These customers prefer the for profit contract since it has a lower base price.
We now prove part (2) of the Proposition. By Lemma 1,p io >p m . Furthermore, we must have
Suppose not. Then this violates the optimality ofp io for investor-owned firms in the problem (1).) Consequently, we have p io < p m .
We now show that this equilibrium is unique. First, in any equilibrium, the only investor-owned contract possible is (p io ,p io ). To see this, first note that all investor-owned firms must usep io by penalty optimality. Then, suppose a contract is offered by an investor-owned firm with p < p io . Such a contract would make negative profits, so this is not an equilibrium. Suppose instead a contract is offered by an investor-owned bank with p > p io . If (p io ,p io ) is also offered in the equilibrium, then the contract (p,p io ) would attract no customers. And if (p io ,p io ) is not also offered in the equilibrium, then the set of contracts violates free entry since customers choosing (p,p io ) would be made better off by (p io ,p io ). Analogous arguments establish that in any equilibrium, the only mutual contract possible is (p m ,p m ).
Consider now an alternative equilibrium in which only (p io ,p io ) is offered. Such a contract set would violate free entry since the contract (p m ,p m ) if offered would satisfy penalty optimality for mutuals and nonnegative profits (as shown above) and would make some types of customers better off (as also shown above).
Similarly, consider an alternative equilibrium in which only (p m ,p m ) is offered. Such a contract set would violate free entry since the contract (p io ,p io ) if offered would satisfy penalty optimality for for-profts and nonnegative profits (as shown above) and would make some types customers of better off (namely, those withc <p m who expect to pay no penalty under either contract and thus prefer the lower base price p io ).
We have thus established uniqueness of the equilibrium. Finally, we turn to part (3) of the Proposition. We have already established that consumers with c <p m prefer investor-owned banks and consumers withc >p io prefer mutuals. Now consider consumers withp m <c <p io . They receive the payoff −p m −p m from choosing a mutual and the payoff −p io −c from choosing an investor-owned bank. Note: All figures are calculated for the entire sample (i.e. unconditional on having an introductory APR or a default APR distinct from the standard purchase APR). By "Special Intro APR" we refer to an introductory APR that is unequal to the standard purchase APR. The "Intro APR (%)" figure is not conditional on having a special intro APR, and includes cards with introductory rates equal to the purchase rate. The same pattern is followed for the figures on balance transfer introductory rates and penalty rates. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the issuer level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Source: Bankrate.com survey, first week of July 2008. Note: Marginal effects from probit regressions reported. CUcheck is an indicator for whether the household has its primary checking account at a credit union. CUCC is an indicator for whether the household has its primary credit card at a credit union. WantLowFee is an indicator for whether the respondent chose "Low fees or service charges" as the most important reason for choosing their checking account institution. CarryBal is an indicator for whether the household ran a non-zero credit card balance in the month prior to the survey. Controls include sex, age, age 2 , race dummies, education dummies, income dummies, industry dummies, occupation dummies, and year of survey dummies. Regressions are weighted using SCF sampling weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 1989 Finances -2004 Note: Credit union users are respondents who hold a credit card issued by a credit union. Definition of "Public Sector" includes public administrators and military personnel, but excludes teachers and police officers. This narrow definition was used because coarse occupational grouping in the publicuse version of the SCF made it impossible to construct a broader group without including non-public sector employees as well. Weighted with SCF sampling weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Source: 1989 Source: -2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.
